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Human Rights in ‘Controlling and Combating Corruption’:  





 Theory-based conversations and impassioned politics of social action and 
movement talk concerning corruption vary a great deal in their assumptions and their 
approaches. Most movement folks remain, at times willingly, ‘illiterate’ in theory-
based approaches; likewise most theory folks remain little-versed in the paralogics of 
social protest. No doubt, the activist and movement folks may be stunned by some 
questions that developmental and new institutional economists raise: the former, for 
example, suggesting that some levels of corruption may be ‘functional’ to 
development and the latter even wondering ‘why levels of corruption are not even 
higher’2!  Even so, the question of beneficial side- effects is a serious theoretical 
thematic; even as I write this, I come across an article speaking to us about the 
‘developmental’ effects of Somali Piracy3. Activists who disdain such explorations 
as ‘justifying’ corruption need still to be aware of the limits of a moralizing politics 
just as ‘rational choice’ theory folks need to reconceptualise the ‘costs’ of corruption  
as singularly experienced by  the worst victims of ‘corruption’ in ways that give 
dignity to their voices of suffering.  Someday, if indeed the day ever comes, this 
divide may be more imaginatively addressed and even perhaps redressed. 
 
 Corruption theory is not by any means a unified field. Disagreements persist 
about what sorts of conduct and behavior should be counted as ‘corruption’; the 
ways of measurement of the levels of corruption; appropriate law/policy regimes 
entailed in   countering corruption; methods of comparative and historical study of 
corruption and their pertinence; and the causes of corruption. The only areas of 
agreement are:  (a) corruption-free society is impossible; (b) it is best to engage 
address governance corruption as a matter of highest priority. 
 
In contrast, and at rate as I read the narratives of popular anti-corruption movements, 
movement-folks regard the ideal of a engagement with governance corruption–free 
society as attainable and  further suggest that any excessive engagement with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  U.Baxi@warwick.ac.uk;  Emeritus Professor, Warwick and Delhi; currently Fellow at Kate 
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2  See, The New Institutional Economics of Corruption (London, Routledge, 2005) at 3 (Johann 
Graf Lambsdorff, Markus Taube and Matthias Schramm, Ed.) 
 
3   See, Anja Shortland, “ ‘Robin Hook’: The Developmental Effects of Somali  Piracy”. Economics 
of Security Working Paper 54, Berlin: Economics of Security’’ www.economics-of-security.eu 
(visited 15 October 2011.) 
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governance corruption ignores the pervasive domains of social conduct, inclusive of 
state-like actors, so varied and different as the wielders of economic and religious 
power on the one end of the spectrum and agents of counterpower including 
resistance and even insurgent movements. 
 
 Further, many an anti-corruption crusade in the Global South, and movements 
against the state bureaucratic socialism which birthed the formation of a post-
socialist societies, remain imbued with an ethical approach – which irritates the 
knowledge producers of corruption theory.  This approach transforms the terms of 
discourse: corruption emerges not merely as a political evil, but an ethical one 
constituting a quintessential perversion of human autonomy, always grounded in the 
idea of the performance of one’s obligations towards the others. In this view,  the 
moral life of individuals as well as the forms of associational life, each one of us 
remains infinitely obligated to regard the other an end in ‘itself’  and never to  regard 
the other as means to one’s own agency. This perspective stands articulated 
variously – whether expressed in terms of a Kantian ‘Categorical Imperative’ or the 
languages of Emmanuel Levinas as an infinite obligation towards the ‘face’ of the 
suffering, even vulnerable, others4.What poignantly stands contrasted here is a 
distinctive ‘political economy’ type approach that regards ‘corruption as  an ‘order 
of things’ inherent or even endemic  to governance practices. 
 
 These are broad images of contrasting styles of thought and action that I must 
indeed mention, even when I may not, within the constraints of this paper be able to 
directly address. Allow me, then, to start with the caution that Susan Rose-Ackerman 
struck5 in saying that ‘good ideas’ are in themselves not enough in combating 
governance corruption Allow me also, some reader-unfriendly yet environmental –
friendly acronyms that I  here  filly deploy! 
 
 Good ideas are those then which can be put to work-a-day use in combating 
the menace especially of governance corruption. In no field, the pragmatist 
counsel—truth is the cash value of an idea--- seems more pressing than in combating 
and controlling corruption [CCC, hereafter.] 
 
 CCC discourse and action agenda does not deny the importance of a 
multidimensional understanding of ‘corruption’; yet has limited use for historical, 
cultural, and anthropological understandings; excluded thus also are (to borrow a 
striking metaphor from Perry Anderson) the ‘lineages of state’ and utopic discourses 
envisioning ‘post-politics’ aiming at the elimination of corruption. It remains wary 
of any distraction from the tasks at hand; understandably, culture or history based  
forms of understanding that generate some ‘justificatory’ strategies such as the 
practices of ‘ethno-clientism’ (in some African societies and states, though not 
surely exclusively at these sites) are of no use for CCC. Not fully understandable is 
the dread of the ‘J’ word: the notion that systemic governance corruption—SGC, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4   See, Upendra Baxi, ‘Judging Emmanuel Levinas? Some Reflections on Reading Levinas, Law, 
Politics,’ The Modern Law Review, 72(1): 116-129(2009.) 
  
5   See, her magisterial work, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform 
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999.) 
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hereafter-- is inherently offensive to deeply held notions of justice in bounded 
societies; notably also remains conspicuous by its absence the nascent discourse of 
approaches to global justice6.  
 
 What emerges as paramount then is a specific regime of global social policy 
(GSP) discourse. Its subtexts reveal an epidemiological approach, yielding 
preeminently diagnostic and therapeutic tools and programs of action. 
Understandably, then, SGC emerges as a cross-border problem; governance 
corruption is thus no longer apperceived as a necessary evil but rather as a threat to 
‘our common future.’ GSP constructs an ever-widening scope for intergovernmental 
and inter-institutional networks of common global social cooperation fashioning 
CCC strategies. In this sense, the pandemic of ‘failed states’ (or rather States made 
to fail differentially by the actions of global hegemonic powers) emerges as a serious 
GSP concern. 
 
 Well-developed remains in GSP/CCC discourse articulate visions and 
versions of common/public goods. Governance transparency and accountability 
emerge not just as stratagems of CCC but as global public virtues. So does the idea 
of development, human and social, that gets corrupted itself by SGC; GSP also 
shares complex, languages of ‘good governance. Further, it insists on providing a 
level- playing field for the communities of multinational corporations and direct 
foreign investment regarded as engines of national, regional, supranational, and 
global development. In privileging overall the discourse of economic theory and 
policy sciences, GSP approach to CCC as developed by networks of international, 
supranational, regional institutions and organizations and actors is however not 
concerned to develop any explicit meta-ethical framework. 
  
 Various actants (to evoke Bruno Latour’s actor-network phrase regime) also 
contribute to   the shared objectives of GSP/CCC. I refer here to the infinite routine 
labors of assortments/assemblages of human rights and the ‘new’ social movements 
and also to the various avatars of the ‘New Sovereign’--- people’s movements 
against SGC, a most resplendent example here provided by the ‘Arab Spring.’  
 
 At play and war here are two different genre of public reason: human rights 
and social movement/activist discourse participates in public reason highlighting the 
costs of SGC (and corruption generally), and fostering the tasks of CCC in many 
different ways. In one register, the activist discourse manifests the variegated 
histories of affect named as ‘indignation entrepreneurship7.’  These histories are  the 
diverse roles in which the activist discourse contributes to the shaping of the CCC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  See, generally, for the dread of the ‘J’ word, Upendra Baxi,’ The Place of the Human Right to 
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John Harrington and Maria  Stuttaford (ed) Global Health and Human Rights (London Routledge, 
2010). 
  
7   See Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Cass R. Sunstein,  ‘Inequality and Indignation,’ Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 30: 4, pp. 337-362 (2001). 
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strategies and polices, not as fully as one may wish ‘integrated’ in the GSP/CCC 
discourse.   
 
 The variances are as important as the commonalities between GSP and 
activist discourses. Common to both remain of course the insistence of governance 
transparency and accountability. Even so, the differences remain significant. Many a 
Global South social and human rights movement engages SGC as joint production of 
national governing elites and the forces of neoliberal technoscientific global capital. 
More than the pale reference to the ways in which SGC distorts-- and miscarries- 
anti-poverty programs (now stylized in a neoliberal gesture as ‘inclusive growth’), 
these movements foreground the scale and depth of human and social suffering thus 
produced. They thus protest the GSP version of common public good (free flows of 
global capital investment across, marking an advent of deregulation as a form of 
regulation) in the languages of state capture very differently than available in policy 
sciences/economist approaches. At stake, then, are radically different acts of 
authorship of the CCC strategies. In my recent work8, I demonstrate why is 
important to take these acts of authorship seriously: put another way, I believe that 
suffering humans and communities of resistance remain always the first authors of 
contemporary human rights values, norms, and standards. In the CCC context they 
articulate a radical impulse urging us to take seriously the SGC forms of human and 
social suffering as way of taking human rights seriously.  
  
 It is no part of my intention to offer any critique of the GSP approach, at least 
in so far as I grasp this. If at all, this must remain a conversational task for another 
day! Rather, all I wish to bring to the table is the question why taking seriously the 
Idea of human rights may not be good enough as contributing to the current wave of 
global concern about SGC.  There is no doubt that human rights elements are often 
apperceived in GSP discourse as ‘counterproductive’ to controlling it, if only 
because these often escalate transaction costs via stringent due process type 
requirements that evoke the standard entailments of presumption of innocence, 
problems arising from the evidentiary standards, protracted trial processes, the 
constitutional legality of asset control/confiscation, and the vagaries of adjudicative 
process. While anti-corruption strategists and advocates do not deny the importance 
of due process rights, at least some of these urge minimalist deference and call for an 
effective re-tooling, if not restructuring of, legal orders.  
 
 In general, CCC is thought in the main as a set of regulatory mechanisms 
providing a variety of disincentives to SGC. Here, the focus is on understanding 
structures of governance corruption in terms of markets whose economic rationality 
needs to be enfeebled incrementally and progressively by regulatory policies. The 
enunciation  of a specific, as well as a universal human right to immunity from SGC 
which I here urge in some detail may be regarded as complicating, if not enervating, 
the objectives and strategies resulting from GSP/CCC goals of fostering common 
social cooperation among states and international organizations. Articulation of a 
new human right complex of norms and standards seems often thought as 
constituting entirely avoidable set of impediments to a programschrift of a global 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  See, Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights ( Delhi, Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2008). 
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anti-corruption action agendum conceived almost entirely as an affair of GSP. GSP-
oriented broad based consensus is thought to provide a superior option than any that 
any be eventually provided by human rights based approaches. 
 
Towards an Enunciation of a New Universal Human Right   
 I still wish to suggest the intrinsic importance of a new enunciation of a 
universal human right to immunity from SGC [shortly put hereafter as ‘new human 
right, or NHR.] Many questions arise, of course. First, what would be the normative 
content of this new right – the content question? Second, how may this enunciation 
relate to the ‘family’ of existing human rights, whether in terms of the binary 
distinction between ‘civil and political rights on the one hand and on the other 
‘social, economic, and cultural’ human rights, or those of ‘generations’ of human 
rights—the ‘juridical’ question? Should such a normative enunciation proceed as an 
emanation from the extant ‘soft’/’hard’ law regimes of human rights or emerge 
autonomously of these? Third, the scope question:  who would be the addresses of 
this new Right? And how may this enunciation help or hinder the existing GSP 
regimes? Fourth, the implementation question: How may be such a right 
implemented /enforced within and across states?  
 
 A general remark justifying any advocacy of this new human right is 
necessary though clearly not sufficient. The need for an explication of a NHR arises, 
if only because  SGC forms and grammars often militate against the exercise, 
enjoyment, and realization of internationally enshrined human rights values, norms, 
and standards, and contributes to regimes of repression entailing both human abuses, 
and human rights, violations. Given this, how may we understand the fact that 
international enunciations/instruments do not codify immunity from governance 
corruption as a human rights value?  
 
 Even as late as 2009,  the International Council on Human Rights and 
Transparency International Report entitled Corruption and Human Rights: Making 
the Connection has to invoke, rather heavily, a demonstration of how ‘corruption’ 
(articulated broadly) results in violations of severally enshrined human rights values, 
norms, and standards. Important as all this remains, the Report does not go so far as 
to commend the translation at least of SGC into an autonomous human right to 
immunity from SGC. Much the same may be said about the overall stance of the 
2010 Report Integrating Human Rights in the Anti-Corruption Agenda: Challenges, 
Possibilities and Opportunities. These remain conseuentialist arguments, and for that 
reason no less crucial. Yet, I believe that an articulation of new human rights values, 
standards, and norms remains equally imperative. 
 
 Further and as far as I know, this GSP-fostered reluctance seems also shared 
by the ongoing labors of the International Law Commission, and the UN Human 
Rights Treaty-Bodies. The former even pursuing its task of progressive codification 
of international law—especially of the law of state responsibility – and the latter in 
its pursuit of international state parties to human rights treaties – singularly fail to 
articulate norms and standards facilitating progression towards an enunciation of this 
‘new’ human right. To offer yet another striking example, the ICC Rome Treaty thus 
fails to name SGC as an element of ‘crimes against humanity.’ 
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 Understanding this lack entails some Foucault-like genealogical labors, as yet 
not in sight. Further, GSP discourse accentuating SGC criminalization, it may be 
argued, remains far ‘superior’ than any human rights based regard. If so, the jury 
remains out, as it were, on this question. Put another way, it is not clear why the two 
approaches should remain inherently incompatible, rather than mutually reinforcing. 
 
 All this then raises the question of value-addition. What may be, put another 
way, be ‘gained’ and ‘lost’ in this translation from GSP to human rights languages? 
The several and serial, major concerns thus already framed earlier demand a close 
attention. I visit here some of these concerns.  
 
The Normative Content Question   
 Unlike some eminent human rights scholars (notably Ndiva Kofele-Kale9), I 
do not here advocate any individual and collective human right to a ‘corruption -free 
society.’ My reason for this, far from constituting any disagreement with this 
ideational postulate,  relates to the stark fact that the dominant  GSP/CCC discourse 
remains impervious to any full recognition of these struggle-based utopic ideals, 
fully scared of the tasks of its translation.  
 
 Perforce, I attempt the next best via some translations  into the forms of  
contemporary human rights languages, which dares to present NHR as  persuasively 
prefigured in the pre-existing sources of international law, whether customary, 
treaty-based, or the exponential growth of ‘soft law’ standard. Put differently, what 
we have here is an inherently- struggle based instantiation and postulation of a NHR 
proselytized by the’ New Sovereign’ and the activist discursive agents.  These, in 
turn, remain beings who seek to affirm the practices of sentimental moral public 
reason, as well as insurgent public reason, fully contesting the unreasoned reason of 
globalization often schematized by some arch- practitioners of avant-garde 
corruption theory. At sake then is the prerogative of translation into those of  NHR.   
 
 My plea for a universal human right for immunity from SGC is based on its 
necessity in a postliberal world and its deniability as well as feasibility. A threshold 
problem of course remains analytical: How may ‘we’ operationalize the constitutive 
elements of the difficult category of SGC? It would be as cruel as carrying MIC to 
Bhopal, as it were, before so learned a peer group, for me to delineate these 
elements. Yet, this remains a primary task.  
 
 First, as a juridical (not moral) right the new human right (NHR) presents 
itself  is an individual and collective human right to immunity from ‘kleptocracy,’ a 
most comprehensively pernicious SGC manifestation. Put another way, SGC occurs 
in its most obnoxious form when the Head of a government and his/her regime 
siphon-off community resources for their own personal gain/greed. As Kofele-Kale 
reminds us this state of affairs includes ’acts of indigenous spoliation where there is 
only a taker, a corrupted individual but no givers or corruptors,’ in turn disrupting 
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the binaries of demand and supply side governance corruption, or the active versus 
passive ‘bribery.’ I believe that the proposed NHR more adequately addresses this 
catastrophic SGC form.  
 
 Second, and in this sense this NHR is a direct negation of a sovereign right of 
impunity claimed by kleptocrats, whether sovereign- state actors/ networks, or their 
normative cohorts—the sovereign-like state transcendent entities/networks (see, as to 
this, the discussion under the ‘scope’ question.)  
 
 Third, the NHR that I propose is an aspect of the ‘right to have rights’ (to 
adapt a fecund phrase-regime of Hannah Arendt.) It entails many specific component 
rights – sets of human rights to right to information, access to equitable and effective 
procedures and institutions enabling complaints against governance corruption 
without victimization (such as whistleblower protection and more crucially the right 
against enforced disappearance caused by state militarism), the right to access to 
constitutional remedies, including effective witness protection, among others.  
 
 Fourth, SGC often assumes governance forms/grammars of ‘state –
sanctioned’ or ‘state-protected’ corruption resulting in near-total impunity. What 
may these terms mean (or be made to signify)? As concerns ‘state-sanctioned’ SGC, 
we may say that it occurs/ results ‘when committed as part of a plan or 
policy’(borrowing from the language of Rome Treaty (Article 3); or when 
‘committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a 
Government or by any organization or group’ that results in results in seriously 
disadvantaging a part of the population’ (to borrow elements of Article 18 of the UN 
1996 Draft Code Concerning Crimes Against Peace and Security of ‘Mankind’). 
 
 Fifth, the second descriptive term—‘state-protected corruption- remains 
problematic, absent an international consensus about the core elements of SGC. In 
my view at least this at least entails a NHR enunciation to a right to an adequate 
SGR policy and law regimes. These may often lead, in net effect, to various practices 
of state–protected SGC. Immunity of incumbent elected officials from criminal 
prosecution provides one example; equally important remain some self-legislated 
immunity for deposed/superannuated heads of states/governments. Further, many 
anti-corruption polices and laws, especially the postcolonial, effectively immunize 
invigilation and prosecution of SGC actors by the requirement of prior official 
sanction, all too often not forthcoming, nor bound by the due process type 
entailments for the exercise of governmental discretionary powers. As concerns 
bureaucratic actors , the requirement of prior sanction for prosecuting SGC feats is 
based on : [1] the protectionist argument -- the apprehension that in particular 
business and industry interests (as well as the  NGOs) may impale ‘conscientious’ 
bureaucrats by way of SGC indictment, and [11] an epistemological argument 
suggesting that only higher-level officialdom remains best poised in terms of 
sensibility, knowledge, and disinterested expertise to determine whether a prima 
facie indictment of corrupt acts by public  officials in the due, and diligent, discharge 
of their public powers. At least as concerns the Indian experience, I have critiqued 
this argumentative set exploring both the jurisprudence of corruption and the 
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corruption of jurisprudence10 . I believe – beyond authorial vanity-- that this critique 
remains pertinent to the formation of a NHR.  
 
 Sixth, however, related difficulties stand posed by the bleeding heart of 
democratic/representative political systems. As Ackerman, among significant others 
have labored to demonstrate, political ‘representation’ poses some terminal limits for 
CCC/GSP discourse. The concern here invites some Sisyphean-labors drawing 
stable, as well inherently fluctuating, bright lines between, and across, licit and illicit 
campaign funding. When may massive corporate funding of political parties –a 
genre of the First Amendment human right of corporate legal persons— blur this line 
of control, so as to amount to SGC? This first–order concern stands enshrined as 
early as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that urges us to take 
serious the notion that ‘Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his 
country’ via ‘periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage’ (Article 21.) Thus envisaged ‘suffrage’ speaks to us not just about the 
coequal right to vote but also addresses an equal right to contest in ‘free and fair’ 
elections for public office. Unregulated corporate electoral funding practices 
generate vvarious forms of politics of exclusion. It remains unnecessary for me to 
further invoke the newly found fascination with Article 28 UNDHR which insists 
that: ‘Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.’ 
 
 The CCC discourse seeks to operationalize these values by a series of second 
order concerns, and for that reason no less crucial, of course. It makes necessarily a 
distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘extra-legal’ sources for campaign funding. Indeed, 
as Ackerman insightfully points out ‘… strict rules on legal campaign donations may 
simply drive contributions underground into a corrupt netherworld.’ Outside a 
radical restructuring of voting systems, the task of controlling SGC invites us to the 
next best option: the maintenance of a ‘valuable… distinction between legal 
donations from wealthy interests and illegal, secret gifts.’ Important as this 
distinction remains I think that any articulation of NHR takes us much further at 
least in terms enhancing people’s movements towards its further articulation than 
GSP/CCC talk and action? 
 
The ‘Juridical’ Question 
 It remains possible to derive this new right from extant customary, treaty-
based, and ‘soft law’ regimes (the latter especially in terms of the development of the 
right to development11.) I also believe that it remains hermeneutically possible to 
derive this new right from a combination of existing international and regional anti-
corruption conventions, from comparative constitutional interpretation of basic 
human rights, and GSP enunciations such as the UN Millennial Development Goals 
and Programs of Action.   
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 However given the specificity of the NHR here urged, it is best to regard it as 
an exercise in autonomous rights enunciation. The NHR is not all about facilitating 
level-playing fields for commercial competition among Euroamerican state and 
market actors; rather, it aims to establish standards for minimally decent political 
governance safeguarding the human rights of the worst-off SGC affected humans 
everywhere, or more fundamentally their right to be, and to remain, human.  Its 
norms and standards, and questions of scope and implementation, thus open to 
participatory global discussion will contribute to innovation of a new range of shared 
strategies to combat catastrophic SGC feats. Equally importantly, all this would 
enable us to grasp more fully the much–neglected linkages between considerations 
of global justice, human rights and GSP enactments.           
 
The Scope Question  
 The NHR extends to all states and state-like (state-transcendent) entities. As 
concerns states, the NHR crates a corresponding human rights responsibility to enact 
appropriate sets of national legislative, institutional, and policy measures including 
those outlined in the preceding section. Further, as some GSP/CCC discourse 
suggests but this time round reiterated in terms of the NHR obligations  all states 
have a duty  (as an aspect of  international state responsibility) not to allow 
kleptocrats—the  deposed heads of the state, and their cohorts,  regulating the current 
state of ‘safe havens’ for deposed state predators to benefit from ‘indigenous 
spoliation.’ Put differently, NHR entails assets confiscation that aims and results into 
repatriation of stolen national resources/wealth to the peoples of the countries of 
origin.  
 
 A more difficult ‘scope’ question stands presented  by acts of complicity and 
connivance with SGG by MNCs, and related communities of direct foreign 
investors. Exemplary here remains the UN Draft Code concerning human rights 
responsibilities of MNCs and related business entities. Article 21 extends to 
transnational enterprises and other business enterprises. As defined generically by 
Article 21, these in all myriad forms, any and all business entities that include: ‘any 
business entity, regardless of the international or domestic sphere of its activities, 
including a transnational corporation, contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, licensee, 
or distributor; the corporate partnership, or other legal form to establish the business 
entity; and the nature of business entity.’ And Article 23 subjects all these entities 
and stakeholders to a new disciplinary regime of human rights by the prescription 
civil, political, cultural, economic, political, and social rights as set forth in the 
International Bill of Human Rights, as well as the right to development, and rights 
recognized by international humanitarian law, international refugee law, 
international labor law, and other relevant instruments adopted within the United 
Nations system’ [emphasis added.] In particular, Article 3 enjoins obligations that 
forbid these from benefiting from ‘war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, 
torture, forced, or compulsory labor, hostage taking, extra judicial or summary or 
arbitrary executions, other violations of international humanitarian law, and other 
crimes against the human person as defined by international law, in particular 
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international humanitarian law.’ I refrain here from further detailing the NHR-type 
obligations this arising, which I have analyzed elsewhere more fully12.  
 
 Of course, this normative audacity of the Draft Code presents many a 
problem; yet it scarcely invites an early remark of UN Special Rapporteur Jonathan 
Ruggie remark that the Draft Norms do not even deserve ‘the dignity of a third class 
funeral!’With his work, we are back again to a familiar articulation of human rights 
corporate governance voluntarism.’ Space-constraints forbid a critique of the 
determinate labors of Ruggie-type normative reversal and affront, especially when 
the nexus between corporate governance and state repression via SGC remains writ 
large. 
 
The Implementation Question 
 On the international register, once a treaty-based NHR stands enshrined, a 
new UN Treaty-Body will have the custodianship of its interpretation and 
implementation.  
 
 Already, however, some exemplary acts of Global South Apex Court 
adjudicatory leadership suggests ways in which SGC may be brought to book. I may 
here speak about the Indian example that I know best. The Indian Supreme Court has 
continually reinforced the autonomy, and the authority, of the constitutionally –
ordained device of relatively autonomous national election commission to 
superintend corrupt electoral practices. The Court has gone beyond: its suggestive 
jurisprudence has led eventually to a Right to Information Act, and it constant 
replenishment. In the face of Parliamentary reluctance, the Court has successfully 
legislated detailed asset disclosure by candidates in the electoral fray as a 
constitutional human rights norm and standard. Further, in some justifiable 
outpourings of judicial activism the Court has variously asserted its supremacy in 
prescribing strict constitutional standards of integrity in appointment of the Central 
Vigilance Commission; taken over the executive functions of the day-today 
monitoring of SGC high profile cases; and even appointed specialist investigative 
teams/committees to assist the Court. It has also transformed the quotidian rules of 
evidence to allow ‘sting journalism’ video recordings as prima facie evidence of 
SGC13.  
 
 The Court’s doings fly in the face of the universalization of prescriptions for 
judicial role and function – the USA stylized discourse about the ‘anti-majoritarian’ 
dimensions of adjudicatory leadership. Without engaging the complexity of 
adjudicatory leadership role legitimation, the short point here is just this: when 
representative institutions continue to conflate ‘legal’ and ‘extra-legal’ electoral  
funding practices, a NHR type judicial activist orientation contributes mightily in re-
drawing (at least as the Indian experience reveals) some bright-lines. In the context 
of this deliberative Bellagio moment, the concern is just this:  How the ways of apex 
adjudicatory leadership may reinforce a sensibility towards a NHR, marking  a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights, Chapter 9. 
13  See also, C. Raj Kumar, ‘Corruption and Human Rights: Promoting Transparency in Governance, 
and the Fundamental Right to Corruption-Free Services in India,’ 17 Colum. J. Asian L. 31(2003-
2004.) 
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formation contributing towards future itineraries of human rights oriented collective 
growth of sentimental public reason militating against SGC, and also contributing to 
the prowess of GSP/CSS movement?  
 
 It needs noting that adjudicative Indian leadership has proceeded via a 
remarkable responsiveness to activist initiative, often to point of converting the Apex 
Court into the visages of a New Social Movement. Similar stories abound for South 
Asian Apex Courts (outside Burma) and much of the Global South. 
 
 By way of a conclusionary word, all I may say with utmost brevity is just this: 
the practices of activist discourse of resistance and the voices of the new insurgent 
Sovereign in Global South speak to us clearly and compellingly about the decisive 
importance of a new universal human right to immunity from SGC. Perhaps, then,  
GSP/CCC discourse may anxiously consider the task of translation of voices of 
human and social suffering into the languages of human rights values, norms, and 





Baxi, Upendra (1990) Liberty and Corruption: The Antulay Case and Beyond. 
Lucknow: Eastern Book Co. 
 
Baxi, Upendra (2006) The Future of Human Rights, Chapter 9. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Baxi, Upendra (2008) The Future of Human Rights. Delhi: Oxford University Press.  
 
Baxi, Upendra (2009) Human Rights in a Posthuman World: Critical Essays. Delhi: 
Oxford University Press. pp. 124-196. 
 
Baxi, Upendra (2009) Judging Emmanuel Levinas? Some Reflections on Reading 
Levinas, Law, Politics. In: The Modern Law Review, vol. 72, no. 1, 116-129, 2009.  
 
Baxi Upendra (2010). The Place of the Human Right to Health and Contemporary 
Approaches to Global Justice: Some Impertinent Interrogations. In: Global Health 
and Human Rights. John Harrington and Maria Stuttaford (Ed.). London: London 
Routledge 
 
Kofele-Kale, Ndiva (2000) The Rights to a Corruption-Free Society as an individual 
and Collective Human Rights: Elevating Official Corruption as Crime under 
International Law. In: The International Lawyer, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 149-178. 
 
Kumar, C. Raj (2003-4) Corruption and Human Rights: Promoting Transparency in 
Governance, and the Fundamental Right to Corruption-Free Services in India. In: 17 
Colum. J. Asian L. 31. 
 
      15 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1999) Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, 
and Reform. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Shortland, Anja (2011). ‘Robin Hook’: The Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy. 
In: Economics of Security Working Paper 54, Berlin: Economics of security. 
www.economics-of-security.eu (visited 15th October 2011.) 
 
Ullmann- Margalit, Edna and Sunstein, Cass R. (2001) Inequality and Indignation. 
In: Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 337-362. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
